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LIABILITY OF AIR CARRIERS
*BY G. LLOYD WILSON

AND WALTER

S.

ANDERSON

Aircraft Operators as Common Carriers
The liability of operators of airplanes in commercial services,
carrying property or persons for hire, for personal injury or
death of passengers or for loss or damage of property is in the
process of development. The courts have rejected as untenable
the contention that the novelty of the airplane or the youth of
the industry should exclude them from the category of common
carriers if they hold themselves out to serve the public for hire.'
Air transport carriers operating on regular schedules over fixed
or definite routes have been held to be subject to the laws applicable to common carriers. The manner in which the aircraft are
used determines the character of their operations as common
carriers or carriers of other classifications.
In North American Accident Ins. Co. v. Pitts, the court applied
the general definition of a common carrier sanctioned by long usage
in testing the status of an operator of an aircraft,-that of the holding out to serve the general public for hire up to the limit of his
facilities. Thus, the court remarked,-"This court, in Georgia Life
Ins. Co. v. Easter, 189 Ala., 478, 66 So., 514, L. R. A. 1915 C, 456,
quoted with approval this definition of a common carrier 'by land or
water,' and the words 'or air' might be added after the word water
with propriety, since we now have the aeroplane:
* G. Lloyd Wilson, LLL.B., Ph.D., Professor of Transportation and Public
Utilities, University of Pennsylvania; and Director Division of Rates, Office of
Defense Transportation; and Walter S. Anderson. A.B. LL.B., Member, New
Jersey Bar.
1. Smith v. O'Donnell, (5 Pac. (2d) 690), 1931, affirmed in (12 Pac. (2d)
933, 215 Cal. 714), 1932; and see North American Accident Ins. Co. v. Pitts
( 213 Ala. 102, 104 So. 21), 1925; Curtiss-Wright Flying Service v. Glose, (69
Fed. (2d) 710), 1933, certiorari denied (290 U. S. 696), 1933 ; Casteel, et al v.
American Airways, Inc., (261 Ky. 818, 88 S. W. (2d) 976), 1935; Harriman, E. A.
Carriage of Passengers by Air, (1 J. A. L, 33), 1930.
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'The real test whether a man is a common carrier, whether
by land or water, therefore, really is whether he has held out
that he will, so long as he has room, carry for hire the goods of
every person who will bring goods to him to be carried. The test
is not whether he is carrying as a public employment or whether
he carries to a fixed place, but whether he holds out, either expressly or by a course of conduct, that he will carry for hire. so
long as he had room, the goods of all persons indifferently who
send him goods to be carried.'
"This court in that case then stated:
'Under this rule a stage coach, a bus, an automobile, or a
hackney coach, a cab, dray, cart, wagon, or sled, which undertakes for a reward to carry, indiscriminately, passengers or baggage for the public 'so long as there is room,' is a common
carrier.' "2
Where the air transport service operators solicit the patronage
of the traveling public; advertise their services, schedules and routes;
announce rates of fares; publish their baggage regulations; and
otherwise call the attention of the public to their services and charges
they have been held by the courts to be common carriers. In CurtissWright Flying Service v. Glose, action was brought by the widow,
of a passenger who purchased of the defendant airplane operator
a round trip ticket for transportation service by airplane between
Miami and Tampa, Florida. The plane was crashed in attempting to
make an emergency landing near Tampa. The Federal Court held
that the decedent was a passenger and not a charterer of the plane.
The arrangement between the operator and the decedent was based
on a ticket sold at a fixed price. No undertaking to charter a plane had
been discussed by the parties and the service was rendered in the
usual course of the operator's business. A standard contract drawn
by the operator was signed by the decedent over the printed designation "passenger." s
Fixed Routes and Schedules Not Essential Characteristic of
Common Carriers
In the same year in which the Glose case was decided, an Illinois court determined that an airplane operating company which
offered to transport passengers to any destination, but did not oper2. North Amerian Acident Ins. Co. v. Pttts, supra; Curtis,-Wright Flying
Service v. Glose, supra; Casteel, et al v. American Airways, Inc., supra.
3. Curtiss-Wright Flying Service v. Glose, supra. And see also Conklin,
Adm. v. Canadian Colonial Airways, Inc., (266 N. Y. 244, 194 :N. E. 692, 1934
U. S. Av. R 21. and 1935 U. S. Av.R. 97), 1935.
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ate over fixed routes or upon set schedules, and based its rates not
upon a point to point basis but upon a mileage basis of rates, was
liable as a common carrier for the death of a passenger resulting
from the negligent operation of the aircraft.4 In Ziser v. Colonial
Western Airways, Inc., a New Jersey court held an air transport
operator liable as a common carrier for the consequences of the negligent operation of an airplane used in sight-seeing service. The company offered its facilities at the airport for sight-seeing trips and
accepted all applicants for the service excepting persons obnoxious,
because of intoxication or otherwise. The court regarded the operator
as a common carrier although it had on many occasions rejected persons who were objectionable for such reasons, and some times
required prospective passengers to leave the plane to make room for
large parties. The court ruled that a set schedule was not a requisite
in establishing the common carrier statusA
In the previous year, a California court, in Smith v. O'Donnell,
cited above, determined that an aircraft operator may be a common
carrier and liable as such although the aircraft are operated in
circular service returning to the point of departure without landing
en route.6
Upon the basis of the cases decided, it may be stated that
the courts, in determining whether or not the operator of an airplane service is a common carrier, follow the definitions of common carriers of long usage in other forms of transport. They find
to be common carriers of passengers by air transport those who
undertake for hire to carry all persons, indifferently, who may
apply for passage, so long as there is room and there is no legal
excuse for refusing.7
Excuses for Refusing Passengers
An operator of air transportation service may avail himself
of a number of legal excuses for excluding prospective passengers. Thus persons may be refused who are objectionable to
the operator because of improper conduct, drunkenness or noisiness.8 If he avails himself of these legal excuses to refuse accom4. M'Cusker. v. Curtiss-Wrtght Flying Service, (269 II. App. 502. 1933
U. S. Av. R. 105). 193.1.
5. ziser v. Colonial Western Airways, Inc., (10 N. J7.Misc. R. 1118. 162 A
691, 1933 IT.S. Av. R. 11i. 19.qP.
6. (5 Pac. (2d) 690), affirmed (12 Pac. (2d) 933), 1932.
7. (4 R. C. L , 1000, §468) ; Jackson Architectural Iron Works v. iTurlbut,
et at, (158 N. Y. 34, 52 N. E. 665), 1899; and see Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz,
(241 U. S. 252). 1915, in which the court held that it Is what a carrier elects in
fact to do and not what It purports by words to be that governs Its status as a
common carrier.
8. State of Maryland, ex rel. Beall v. Mabeod, et a?, (1932 U. S. Av. R.
94), 1932 (Md. Super. CL) ; Ziser v. Colonial Western Airways, supra.

284

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

modations, or to exclude passengers the operator is none the less
a common carrier, if his service is offered to the general public.
In Law v. TranscontinentalAir Transport, Inc., a Federal District Court held that an airplane operator could refuse to transport
an overload or refuse to transport passengers in bad weather without
altering its status from that of a common carrier to that of a private
carrier. 9
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in 1935, in Casteel, et al v.
American Airways, Inc., affirmed the judgment of a lower court for
the defendant air operator in a suit for damages for the impairment
of the health, humiliation, exposure and mental and physical distress
and discomfort of two of its passengers. In that case a patron who
was known to be suffering with tuberculosis, and his wife, engaged
transportation by airplane from El Paso, Texas, to Louisville, Kentucky. At Fort Worth, Texas, the ill passenger was examined by a
physician at the instance of the air transportation company. The
physician advised that the passenger should not continue his trip by
plane. Over the protests of himself and his wife, he was excluded
from the plane. The defendant air transport company arranged for
first-class hotel accommodations and for transportation of the passengers by rail to their destination. The railroad fares were paid from
the refund due the passengers for the unused portions of the air
carrier's tickets. The trip was completed by railroad and the ill passenger died within a week after arrival at Louisville.
In its decision, the Court said, inter alia:
"Although the same principles must obtain and be applied,
the law of aeronautics cannot be completely synchronized with
the law pertaining to other agencies, for it must be modified to
meet the traffic problems of the novel method. The inherent
nature of the facilities of an airplane cannot be disregarded. ...
Although the safety of the passengers, individually
and collectively, must ever be regarded as the prime criterion,
provision for their convenience and comfort is more essential
aboard an airplane in flight with its restrictions and limitations
of space than on surface carriers where passengers may move
about with some degree of freedom. The right to reject or eject
passengers from an airplane must be sustained not only upon
grounds deemed justifiable where older methods of carriage are
9.

(1931 U. S. Av. R. 205), 1931.

LIABILITY

OF AIR

CARRIERS

used, but other reasonable grounds as well because of the neces-::
sarily close personal proximity of the passengers."1 0
The Purpose of the Flight as a Criterion of the Air Carrier'sStatus.
The decisions of the courts in cases where the status and liability
of the airplane operator as a common or private carrier has been
considered, in relation to the purpose of the flights, are not reconcilable. In Ziser v. Colonial Airways, Inc., and Smith v. O'Donnell,
both cited above, the courts held that the lack of a fixed schedule,
and the operations of planes without landing at points other than
the places Where the flights started, were not factors which negatived
the common carrier status of such operations, if other characteristics
of -common carriage were present.1 1
In suits brought upon policies of insurance covering persons
killed in airplane accidents, the courts have held that an operator
engaged in -taking persons for ten minute pleasure flights over
a summer resort was not a common carrier. In two cases brought
in different courts upon separate insurance policies, both covering a person killed during such a flight, the courts held that an
operator engaged in sight-seeing or pleasure-hop service, Who
operates on such days and at hours and under conditions determined by him; who did not make flights with less than three nor
more than five persons; and who accepted only white persons,
was not a common carrier. Both courts stressed the facts that
the flights were made only upon special arrangements and that
the operator assumed no obligation to serve all who applied for
such transportation.1 2 The courts of Illinois 8 and New York14
have also decided that the operators of this type of flying service
are not to be treated as common carriers.
Degree of Care Required
It has generally been held by the courts that common carriers of"
passengers must exercise the highest degree of care, vigilance and
caution. In seeking to measure the quantum of such care the courts*
have usually distinguished between the standards required of com10. (261 Ky. 818, 88 S. W. (2d) 976). 1935.
11. (10 N. J. Misc. R. 1118, 162 A 591) 1932; and (5 Pac. (2d) 690)"
affirmed (12 Pac. (2d) 933, 215 Cal. 714), 1931.
12. Brown v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., (8 F. (2d) 996). 1925; North
American Accident Ins. Co. v. Pitts, (213 Ala. 102, 104 So. 21), 1925.
.13. Bird, Adm. v. Lauer, (272 I1. App. 522, 1934 U. S. Av. R. 188), 1933.
14. Seaman v. Curtiss Flying Service, Inc., (1929 U. S. Av. R. 48), 1929,
reversed on other grounds (231 App. Div. 867, 247 N. Y. S. 251, 1931 U. S. Av.
R. 227), 1930; and see Stoll v. Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc., (1930 U. S.'
Av. R. 148), 1930, affirmed without opinion (236 App. Div. 664, 257 N. Y. S.
1010, 1932 U. S. Av. R. 163), 1932.
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mon carriers and those imposed by law upon private or contract
carriers. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Wilson v. Colonial
Air Transport, Inc., stated the rule: "It is settled that the degree of
care (required) of a common carrier for hire is measurably greater
than the law imposes on a private carrier for hire, and it would
seem that the proof of the facts and surrounding circumstances need
only be slight in order to set up the presumptive rule of negligence
and call upon the defendant for an explanation; and that in either
case negligence will not be presumed from the mere happening of
an accident." 13
The courts have usually given due regard to the characteristics of the instrumentality of transportation used, in the application of these rules of law to the duty owed by carriers to their
patrons. Trial courts in a number of jurisdictions have included
in their instructions to the juries the statement that carriers by
air are charged with the highest degree of care in the safeguarding of their passengers, consistent with the practical operation
of the plane. 10
Common carriers by aircraft, although required to use utmost
care and diligence, have been held not to be required "to exercise
all the care, skill and diligence of which the human mind can conceive, nor such as will free the transportation of passengers from
all possible perils." 17 Thus a carrier was held not liable for damages
resulting from an accident caused by a crash during a fog, in the
absence of negligence on the part of the carrier. The passenger by
airplane was held to have assumed all the usual and ordinary perils
incident to airplane travel that exist over and above the dangers
against which the common carrier is under a legal responsibility to
guard.18 However, in Greunke v. North American Airways Co., the
court held the carrier liable for only ordinary care. 19
More particularly, it has been ruled that the pilot of a plane,
as an agent of a common carrier, is required to guard and provide against predictable conditions in discharging the carrier's
legal duty to its passengers. He is not held accountable for dif15. (278 Mass. 420, 180 N. E. 212), 1932.
16. Foot. et ol v. Northwest Airways, Inc., (1931 U. S. Av. R. 66), 1930
(U. S. Dist. Ct. Minn.); Hamilton v. O'Toole, (1927 U. S. Av. R. 1.33), 1927
(Mass.) ; Berg v. Seitz, (1931 U. S. Av. R. 111), 1931 (Kans.) : Mcausker v.
Curtiss-Wright Flyin.q Service. Inc., (269 111.App. 502), 1933: Law. v. Trans.
continental Air Transport, (19.31 U. S. Av. R. 205). 1931 (IT. S. District Court,
E . D. Pa.) ; and Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, Inc., (278 Mass. 420, 180
N. E. 212), 1932.
17. See Instructions by court In Allison, Adm. v. Standard Air Lines, Inc..
(-1930 U. S. Av. R. 292). 1910 (U. S. Dis. Ct., S. D. Cal.), affirmed In (65 F. (2d)
668, 1933 U. S. Av. R. 92), 1933.
18. Allison, Adm. v. Standard 4ir Lines, Ino., supra.
19. (1930 U. S. AV. R. 126), 1930.
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ficulties which result when unexpected events occur. He is not
charged with responsibility if accidents are caused by gusts of
wind, sudden snow squalls, fogs, rain or similar unforeseen conditions, unless he has been negligent in assuming that such conditions were not to be encountered. 20 "In an aeroplane accident
the limitation of responsibility may be said to consist of a plane
in good mechanical condition, handled by a careful pilot, maneuvered in a careful way under conditions that, so far as can be
foreseen, are normal, or such as may be foreseen and overcome
by the use of ordinary skill, such as unfavorable weather condi21
tions, so that the ordinary pilot could observe them as such."
Although its juridical import is somewhat lessened by the
fact that the decision of the court was governed by the code law
of California, the determination reached in the suit resulting from
the crash of the Western Air Express plane, on which Martin E.
Johnson and Osa Johnson were passengers, in 1937, is indicative
of the extent of the carrier's responsibility when mishaps occur
because of unusual conditions. The famous couple had engaged
passage from Salt Lake City to Burbank. The plane proceeded
from Salt Lake City to Las Vegas by contact flying. At Las
Vegas the pilot was directed to proceed to Daggett, California,
where he would receive further instructions from defendant's
chief dispatcher at Burbank. Upon arriving at Daggett, the pilot
communicated by radio with the ground station at Burbank and
requested instrument clearance into Burbank. He was authorized
to follow the "procedure to land down through with aid of radio
range." In executing the procedure the pilot was able to maintain his course until he had passed what is known as the cone
of silence at Saugus for the second time. However, when he had
passed it the first time, he had encountered ice which had caused
the ship to toss, roll and vibrate. The pilot testified that he at
that time had given the co-pilot instructions to turn on the deicers. The latter did not do so and the pilot was admittedly aware
of the fact. After passing the cone of silence the second time the
ship started to lose altitude. The pilot then switched off his radio
from the Saugus station beam, and depended upon an average
compass reading to guide him in his course. His explanation for
this was that the ship began to toss and roll so violently that he
had to do it. After leaving the cone of silence for the second time
and while en route from Saugus to Burbank the plane went ap20.
supra.
21.

See Instructions by court in Law v. Transcontitnental Air Transport,
See instructions by court in Seaman v. Curtiss Flying Service, Inc., supra.
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-proximately. three miles off its course to the left. While the pilot
was attempting to regain his position on the course the plane
crashed on Los Pinetos peak in the San Gabriel mountains.
Action was commenced by Osa.Johnson for the injuries she
sustained as the result of the crash and for the. wrongful death
of her husband. The jury returned verdicts for the defendants,
and on appeal, the plaintiffs urged as a reason -for reversal that
the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdicts, in that
undisputed negligence, constituting the proximate cause of the
accident, was admitted upon or by the pilot and others and that
the affirmative defense of Western Air Express that the accident
occurred because of an act. of God was not established by the
defendants.
In dismissing the appeal the court held it to be "a question
of fact for the jury to determine, and not a question of law,
.whether the pilot was guilty of negligence in abandoning the
-Saugus beam and flying on an average compass reading, and in
-consideration of this question they were entitled to consider that
during all of his difficulties the pilot was trying to hold to a compass course of 125 degrees, because, as he testified, he knew that
.was the compass course which would lead to the Burbank airport."
Continuing, the court said:
"Whether the failure of the pilot -to do the exact things provided in the 'procedure to land down through with aid of radio
range'. was a proximate cause of the accident was a question of.
.fact for the jury to determine in the light of existing conditions.
.Respondent Western Air Express concedes that if conditions had
been normal and Pilot Lewis had been able to follow each step of
the 'procedure' and had simply failed to do so, with the resultant
crash and no explanation for its occurrence, there would be no
question whatsoever but that the accident was due to the negligence of the pilot, but respondent contends, and its contention
must be upheld, that it was for the jury to determine whether
the pilot, in the exercise of the highest degree of care, was unable
to do the things required by the 'procedure' because of an act of
God (Civil Code, §3526) ; and further, that it was within the
province of the jury to conclude that the pilot's failure to remain
tuned to a beam under the facts and circumstances present was
not the proximate cause of the crash and that unusual conditions
of icing and turbulence were such that the pilot could not have
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followed a beam because the combination of ice in the carburetors
and extreme air turbulence made it impossible for the pilot to
control the plane either as to course or altitude. The testimony of
both the pilot and plaintiff Mrs. Johnson herself furnished
grounds upon which the jury could predicate a finding that the
disaster occurred by reason of the unusual forces of nature, and
was one which could not have been reasonably anticipated,
guarded against or resisted; that the crash was occasioned by
the violence of the elements alone, and that the agency of men
22
had nothing to do therewith.
In Seaman v. Curtiss Flying Service, Inc., action was commenced for the wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent caused by the
crash of an airplane in which the deceased was a passenger. It was
conceded at the trial that there were no mechanical defects in the
plane. The proof established that the weather was clear on the day
of the accident and that there was a wind blowing from the northwest at a velocity of not more than fifteen miles an hour. Testimony
was also offered that just before the plane crashed it was seen to
turn and dip its right wing. In charging the jury the trial court submitted the question "whether this particular accident was caused by
the negligent act of the pilot, or whether it was caused by some outside force over which he had no control. That is, whether it was
due to an act of God or atmospheric conditions due to a wind and
change of temperature which is known as an unavoidable accident."
In setting aside the determination of the lower court,
late Division, after commenting upon the omission of
court to include in its charge any exposition of the law
constituted an act of God which would in a proper case
defendant carrier, stated:

the Appelthe lower
as to what
excuse the

"the doctrine of vis major, introduced into the situation by
the court in its charge, had no application to the testimony
adduced upon the trial contained in this record." 28
That the air carrier is bound to exercise ordinary precaution for
the safety of its passengers and to protect them against harm which
can be anticipated, either while aloft or on the ground, is demonstrated in Curtiss-WrightFlying Service, Inc. v. Williamson. In that
case a Texas court affirmed judgment for plaintiff in an action in
which plaintiff's decedent, in alighting from the plane walked toward
22. Johnson. et al v. Western Air BXpres8 Cororation, et al, (114 Pac. (2d)
688), 1941.
23. (231 App. Dlv. 867, 247 N. T. S. 251, 1931, U. S. AV. R. 227), 1920,
reversing (1929 U. S. Av. 71. 48). 1929.
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the front of the craft and sustained fatal injuries by coming in
contact with the propeller which had continued to revolve, the motors
not having been cut off when the plane landed. The court held that
the appellant owed to the deceased, as a passenger upon its plane,
"the exercise of that high degree of care for his safety which under
the settled rules of law apply under such circumstances. It was appellant's duty to furnish," appellant's passenger, "a safe place to alight
and a safe egress from its plane to the hangar where he desired
to go. If for any reason it was unsafe to appellant's passenger for
the
the plane to be stopped opposite the hangar and facing north,
' 24
issue of negligence in so doing was one of fact for the jury.
General Rule of Proof
The mere occurrence of an accident per se does riot raise a
presumption of negligence on the part of a common carrier by airplane, despite the fact that the carrier is charged with the duty of
exercising the highest degree of care in protecting its passengers.
The same general rule of proof governs in cases of airplane accidents
as in suits against other types of common carriers excepting when
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applied.
The general rule applicable in suits against carriers for injuries
or other damage alleged to have been caused by the carrier's negligence is that the party who alleges the existence of a fact as the
basis of a cause of accident must bear the burden of establishing it
by proof. The gist of the cause of action is the carrier's negligence
ahd the burden of proving the negligence and that it was the proximate cause of the injury or damage rests upon the plaintiff who
2
alleges it. 5

Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be stated as asserting "that
whenever a thing which produced an injury is shown to have been
under the control and management of the defendant, and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of events does not happen if
due care has been exercised, the fact of injury itself will be deemed
to afford sufficient evidence to support a recovery" by the plaintiff,
"in the absence of any explanation by the defendant tending to show
that the injury was not due to his want of care. * * * The presump24.

(51 S. W. (2d)

Flying Service

(1931 U.

1047),
S. Av. R.

1932, affirming Williamson
1191),

1931,

(Tex. D.

v. Curtiss-Wright

C., 14th Judicial Dist.

Dallas County). See also Berg v. Seitz, supra, and per contra, Hough v. Curtiss
Flying
Inc., (1929 U. S. Av. R. 99), 1929, (Maine).
26. Service,
(5
. C. L. 74, 75, §712) Allison, Adm. v. Standard Air Lines,
Inc.,
supra, and Stoll v. Curtiss Flying hervice, supra
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tion of negligence herein considered, is, of course, a rebuttable presumption. It imports merely that the plaintiff has made out a prima
facie case which entitles him to a favorable finding unless the defendant introduces evidence to meet and offset its effect .. .Where
all the facts attending the injury are disclosed by the evidence, and
nothing is left to inference, no presumption can be indulged-the
26
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no application."
The application of the doctrine to cases arising out of aircraft
accidents has not yet been sufficiently extensive to warrant a valid
statement of the principles or limitation of such application.
Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport was an action brought in the
courts of Massachusetts for injuries sustained by an airline passenger
in a crash alleged to have been caused by one of the motors "going
dead" a few seconds after the plane had taken off. The plaintiff who
sustained the damages testified that the right-wing motor back-fired
after he had entered the plane and while the plane was taxying to
the take-off position. He testified, moreover, that he could see that
the right-wing motor did not revolve at the same speed as the others
when the pilot "revved" them. A few seconds after the plane had left
the ground the right-wing motor went dead, the right side of the
plane tipped, and the plane went into a nose-dive despite the "frantic
efforts of the pilot" to right it.
Defendant offered testimony of the pilot of the plane that it
was in good working order on a previous trip from New York to
Boston, and that he had turned the plane over to inspectors upon
arrival at Boston. Pilot testified that the slower "revving" of the
right-wing motor was done deliberately by him in order to steer the
plane on the ground, that the motors were tested before the take-off,
and that they were running at the same speed on leaving the ground.
The court denied the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur on the basis of this evidence, and stated, in part.
"The principal of res ipsa loquitur only applies where the
direct cause of the accident and so much of the surrounding
circumstances as were essential to its occurrence were within
the sole control of the defendants or of their servants. * * *
It is also to be observed that the doctrine will not be applied
if there is any other reasonable or probable cause from which
it might be inferred there was no negligence at all; nor does it
apply in any instance where the agency causing the accident is
26. (20 R. C. L. 185-188, §156), and Fike, L. R., Air Transport Protection,
(8 Air Law Review 316-333), 1937.
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not under the sole and exclusive control of the person sought
27
to be charged with the injury.1
The inspectors to whom the plane was turned over upon landing at Boston were not shown by the testimony to be the employees
or agents of the defendant airline. It was to this that the court
referred in its qualification cited above.
In the New York case of Goodheart v. American Air Lines, Inc.,
damages were sought for the death of a passenger, alleged to have
resulted from an accident caused by the negligence of the defendant
airline in which the plane crashed on a mountainside. The plaintiff
alleged that the pilot of the plane was negligent in that, among other
things, he deviated many miles from .the safe course which he was
directed to follow, flew at an unsafe altitude, carelessly and without
necessity, in order to avoid extra mileage, and offered proof to sustain these allegations.
The trial court admitted the evidence and submitted the case
to the jury on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. Judgment was for the
plaintiff. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the judgment of
the court below and stated that the submission of the case to the jury
on the res ipsa loquitur theory clearly was error. It cited an earlier
decision in which a res ipsa loquitur problem was presented, stating:
"The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, although it provides a
substitute for direct proof of negligence where plaintiff is unable
to point out the specific act of negligence which caused his
injury, is a rule of necessity to be invoked only when, under the
circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily
28
available."
In applying this rule to the case appealed, the Appellate Division stated in part:
"Here, the plaintiff did not reply on the presumption arising
from the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. On. the contrary, he
pleaded and introduced evidence to establish specific acts of
negligence which, he alleged, resulted in the accident. Under
'29
these circumstances, the doctrine did not apply."
In Conklin v. Curtiss Flying Service, Inc., a New Jersey trial
court, in an action at law resulting from the crash of a plane alleged
27.

Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, Inc., supra.

28. Citing Witcher v. Board of Education, Rensselaer, (233 App. Div. 184,
251 N. Y. S., 611, 612), 1931.
29. Goodheart v. American Air LInes, Inc. (252 App. Dlv. 660, 1 N.

(2d) 288), 1938.

Y. S.
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to have been due to the stopping of the motors during flight, in*structed the jury that there was no obligation on the part of the air
transport carrier to explain: what actually caused the accident, but
that it was the plaintiff's duty to prove negligence by a fair prepon*derance of the evidence.8 0
" A contrary view was expressed by the New York Appellate
Division in Seaman v. ,CurtissFlying Service, Inc., which has been
discussed above. 81 From the court's opinion it is not evident that
: the plaintiff offered any testimony as to the cause of the crash, but
that the theory was advanced that the mishap was the result of the
negligent act of an over-confident pilot making a sharp turn at too
steep a bank at an altitude and at a place where it was reasonably to
be expected that upper currents of air might tip the wing of the
plane, thereby exposing its passengers to danger. In setting aside the
-verdict of the court below, the court said:
"The charge was likewise prejudicial, in its failure to charge
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which had, under the facts
appearing in this record, application to this case as a rule 8of2
evidence to aid the jury in passing upon the issue of liability."
During one of the trials had in Stoll, Adm. v. Curtiss Flying
Service, Inc., a New York trial court instructed the jury that it
should take into consideration the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, in weighing the evidence, if no proof was offered in support of any allegation
that the accident occurred through the defendant's negligence.33
in Smith v. O'Donnell, cited above, the court was called upon
to determine whether or not the res ipsa loquitur doctrine could be
resorted to by the plaintiff in an action involving the crash of aircraft in mid air. The court remarked that since such a mishap does
of care is used the doctrine
not ordinarily occur if the proper degree
34
was properly submitted to the jury.
In Cohn v. United Air Lines Transport Corporation,action was
commenced by an administratrix to recover damages on account of
the death of her intestate resulting from the crash of an airplane
while on a test flight. The facts of the case did not involve the liability
of a common carrier of passengers, but the determination of the
court with respect to the same is of interest here in relation to the
application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The plaintiff alleged
30'. (1930 U.

S. Av. R. 188), 1930.

31. Page 12, ante.
32. Seaman v. Curtiss Flying Service, Inc., supra.
33. Stoll, Adm. v. Curtiss Flying Service, Inc., supra.
34. Smith v. O'Donnell, supra.
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negligence of the defendant generally, but set forth no specific acts
of negligence and relied entirely on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in
establishing her right to recovery. In its opinion, the court made the
following remarks: "The doctrine has a somewhat limited application, making it, as it were, a sort of refuge of last resort for the
relief of injured persons where specific acts of negligence are incapable of being alleged and proved by the ordinary methods." After
mentioning a few of the unavoidable causes for crashes of airplanes,
the court then determined the doctrine could not apply "if there is
any other reasonable or probable cause from which it might be
inferred that there was no negligence at all." 3 5
This court also made the observation that there existed no widespread fund of information as to the operation, care and characteristics of airplanes, such as is available relating to trolleys and steam
railroads, to justify the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
Courts of Texas and California, and a Federal Court, have held
that if an injured party or a representative of a decedent alleges
specific acts of negligence on the part of the defendant carriers, he
may not then avoid the burden of proving the carrier's negligence by
relying upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to raise a presumption
of negligence on the part of the defendant carrier. 6
What Risks Does An Airplane Passenger Assume?
It has now become well established as a principle of law that
an airplane passenger may be held to have assumed all the ordinary
7
and usual perils incident to this mode of travel .
Airplane passengers do not assume the risks that the planes
may be "improperly, carelessly or negligently operated."'3 8 Nor do
they take upon themselves the risk of any defects in the construction
of the planes or the adjustments of the planes not patent to them
when they enter the planes.8 9
They do, however, assume dangers which cannot be averted by
the carriers by the exercise of the degree of care which the law
35. Cohn v. United Air Lines Transport Corporation (17 F. Supp. 865),
1937 (U. S. Dist Ct., D. Wyo.).
36. English v. Miller (42 S. W. (2d) 642), 1931; Johnson et ol V. Western
Air Express Corporation, et al, supra; and Law v. Transcontinental Air Transport, supra.
37. See instructions by court in Allison, Adm. v. Standard Air Lines, Inc.,
supra, and Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, Inc., supra.
38. See instructions by court In Law V. TranscontinentalAir Transport, Inc.,
supra, and instructions by court in Stoll, Adn. v. Curtiss Flying Service, Inc..
supra.

29.

State of Maryland ex rel. Beall v. McLeod, supra.
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requires.40 Thus airplane passengers have been held to assume the
risk involved in the sudden occurrence of storms, the dangers incident to navigation through storms, and landing, provided the pilots
have not been negligent in the manner of handling the plane under
the unexpected circumstances.4 1
In Cohn v. United Air Lines Transport Corporation,cited above,
the court after making its observation as to the applicability of the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine, stated the following:
"Man has made rapid srides within a very small cycle in his
endeavor to become master of the air, * * *, but with the
exceedingly large number of unexplained and inexplicable catastrophies it is evident that he has not yet become such master.
It will not do to discourage the pioneer by making him assume
undue hazards in a monetary way. In the meantime it is quite
evident that those who choose air-ways for transportation must
in many instances be held to have themselves assumed the
42
risk."
Contractual Limitations of Carriers' Liability for Negligence
The courts of the United States have generally accepted the
rule that provisions in contracts of transportation, between air lines
and their passengers, recited in tickets or otherwise, exempting airplane carriers for hire from liability for loss or damage suffered
by their passengers arising from the negligence of the carriers or
their servants are unavailing to relieve the carriers from responsibility because they are contrary to public policy.
In Law v. TranscontinentalAir Transport, Inc., the trial court
in charging the jury intimated strongly that the fact that a ticket
issued to the passenger contained a statement that the air transport
company was not a common carrier was not controlling in determining the carrier's status and that the jury might properly find the
defendant to be a common carrier. The court explained that the
status was to be ascertained not by the ticket's stipulation but by
what the carrier held itself out to be. 42a Likewise, a stipulation in
the carrier's ticket that the carrier was not to be liable for its negligence, or that its liability was to be limited, has been held to give
43
the carriers no immunity for the consequences of their negligence.
40.
supra.
41.
supra.
42.
42s.
43.

See Instructions by court in Allison, Adm. v. Standard Air Lines, Inc.,
See Instructions by court In Law v. Continental Air Transport, Inc.,
Cohn v. United Air Linea Transport Corporation, supra.
Law v. Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc., supra.
Curtiss-Wright Flying Service v. Glose, supra.
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In Conklin v. Colonial Airways, Inc., the air line offered three
trips or classes of tickets to prospective passengers. Class A tickets
-provided for a $5,000 maximum liability for death or injury of
,passengers, Class B for a $10,000 maximum liability, and Class C
ticket for a maximum of $15,000. liability. Under New York law
passenger carriers may lawfully offer passengers their. choice between full common carrier liability and limited liability, providedthe
passengers are given consideration in the form of reduction in rates
if they voluntarily choose transportation subject to limited liability.
In this case, however, the court held that the passenger had not been
given a voluntary choice between full and limited liability, and, for
this reason, the stipulation appearing in the ticket, held by the plaintiff's decedent, did not serve to prevent recovery in an amount in
44
excess of the amount designated on the ticket.
Under English law, carriers of passenger by air. may by special contracts limit their liability even when the loss or damage suffered by the passengers is caused by the carrier's negligence.45
Generally, under American decisions, attempts to limit or avoid
liability by camouflage of words in tickets or contracts are unavail46
ing to relieve a common carrier of its obligations as such.
In Noakes v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., et al, a libel was filed by
the widow of a passenger who was killed in the crash of the flying
boat Cavalier, which fell while en route from New York to Bermuda.
Respondent contended the Cavalier Was a "vessel" within the definition contained in (R. S. §3, 1 U. S. C. §3, 1 U. S. C. A. §3) and
therefore entitled to the benefit of the limitation of liability statutes
which preclude recovery beyond the amount or value of .the interest
of the owner in the vessel and its pending freight. (R. S. §4283-4289,
46 U. S. C. §183 et seq., 46 U. S. C. A. §183 et seq.) The Federal
District Court of the Southern District of New York did not agree
with this contention and had the following to. say: "It seems to-me
-that the Cavalier in the progress of her flight through the air as she
-was at the time the occurrence complained of was alleged to have
taken place, cannot be classified as a 'vessel' such as the statutes and
laws relating to vessels are intended to include. The trend of the
' 47
statutes and the courts is to treat aviation as sui generis.
44. Conklin v. Canadian Colonial Airways, Inc., supra.
45. (5 R. C. L., 8, § 665).
46. Edmunds, J. K., Aircraft Passenger Ticket Contracts, (1 J. A. L. 321),
1930; and Zollman, Carl, Aircraft Carriers as Common Carriers, (1 J. A. 1.
190), 1930.
47. (29 F. Supp. 412), 1939. See also Dollins v. Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc., (27 F. Supp. 487), 1939; The Crawford Bros. No. 2, (215 F. 269,
271), 1914; Ashel B. Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service Corporation, et al,

(232 N. Y. 115, 133 N. E. 371, 18 A. L. R. 1324), 1921, and United States v.
Northwest Air Service, (88 F. (2d) 804), 1935.
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Liability of Airplane Carriers of Property
Common carriers of goods by all means of transport have been
held generally liable for loss or damage of goods entrusted to them
for transportation and responsible for their safe transportation and
proper delivery to the consignee except for loss or damage occasioned
by acts of God, of the public enemy or other excuses for failure to
transport or deliver recognized by the common law or applicable
statutory law.4 8 Common carriers of goods by airplane are logically
subject to the same general rule and are under the duty of exercising
reasonable care and skill in making their planes fit and safe for the
carriage of the goods transported and of transporting the goods with
reasonable care. Like other common carriers of goods, airplane carriers apparently may not avoid or limit their liability for loss suffered
as the consequence of the carrier's negligence or that of their
servants.
The Railway Express Agency, Inc., in the conduct of its air
express service, transports goods in interstate commerce upon air
express receipts,-a species of bill of lading contract, which provides,
-like the uniform express contract used in the railway express
service on land and water routes,--that the liability of the carrier
is limited, in consideration of the rate charged for the transportation
service, which is dependent upon the value of the property, -and is
based upon an agreed valuation of not exceeding $50.00 for any shipment of 100 pounds or less, and not exceeding 50c per pound, actual
weight, for any shipment in excess of $100.00, unless a greater value
is stated in the air service uniform express receipt. Unless a greater
value is declared and stated in the receipt, the shipper agrees that
the value of the air express shipment is so limited and that the liability of the express carrier shall in no event exceed this value. 49 The
air service uniform express receipt provides that the Railway Express Agency, Inc., will not be liable, unless caused by its own negligence or that of its agents, for loss or damage occurring through
natural shrinkage or evaporation or loss due to defects in or the
nature of the goods, escape of live stock, loss of articles of extraordinary value unless enumerated in the express receipt, act or
default of the shipper or owner, improper packing, acts of God,
public enemy acts, authority of the law, quarantine, strikes, riots,
hazards of state of war, occurrences at custom's warehouse, exam48. (4 R. C. L. 696, § 175), Interstate Commerce Act, Parts I, II and III.
49. Air Service Uniform Express Receipt, Terms and Conditions, Paragraph
2, Supplement 3, Air Express Division Tariff No. 7. C. A. B. No. 7. See also
Express Cases, (117 U. S. 1), 1885, for discussion of status of express carriers
generally.
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ination or partial delivery to consignees of C. 0. D. shipments, or
delivery under instructions of consignor to consignee at non-agency
station after shipments have been left at these stations.40
In Asian v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., an English Court held that
recovery by an owner of a shipment of gold was precluded by the
terms and conditions of the contract of carriage under which the
goods were transported. The contract contained, among other provisions, stipulations that the air transport company was not a common
carrier, that it reserved the right to refuse to accept any goods offered
for carriage, that the goods were accepted for transportation only at
the sender's risk, and that the air transport company accepted no
liability for loss suffered with respect to the goods.
The cpurt observed that the defendant air lines had not expressed willingness to transport goods for all, without discrimination,
and was, therefore, not a common carrier of goods, and the sender
was precluded from recovery by these terms of the contract of transport. Its opinion indicated, however, that common carriers of airplane were subject to the common law liability of common carriers
51
for goods accepted by them for transportation and delivery.
It would appear from this decision that the court in declaring
the air carrier a private (or contract) carrier, considered as conclusive the carrier's words in its contract, wherein it disclaimed willingness to carry for the public indiscriminately. Other attempts by
carriers to escape common carrier liability by statements of this sort
generally have been unsuccessful, and the court in this case would
have been on sounder ground had it examined the facts of the carrier's operation rather than to have relied to the extent it evidently
did upon its contractual definitions of its status.
In a note in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, the
editor sharply criticizes this decision for the reliance of the court
upon the wording of the carrier's contract rather than upon the character of its operations. "The court would have done well to attach
a minimum significance to the words used, and to inspect carefully
instead the actual character of the defendant's business operations in
determining the company's status. Thus the fact that the company was
organized for the very purpose of offering an air transportation
service, that it published regular tariffs for carriage over established
routes, are considerations present in the instant case, but neglected
50. Ibid, paragraphs 3 and 4. So far as can be discovered by these writers,
no cases have come before the courts involving the liability or limitations of
the liability of the air express division of the Railway Express Agency.
51. (149 L. T. 276), 1933.
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by the court, leading to the inference of an intention to serve all who
should apply."5'1 2 The decision is open to further criticism in that
it gave validity to a contract denying all liability, although the decisions are uniform in permitting carriers to limit their common law
liability with reasonable limits only, and in holding that contracts
which attempt to stipulate against all liability have long been held
in the United States and Great Britain to be of no legal effect because
contrary to public policy.5
Uniform State Law for Aeronautics and Air Carrier Liability
The Uniform State Law for Aeronautics was drafted in 1922
by the Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State Laws. This
uniform act has been adopted in 22 states and territories of the
United States, with modifications in some of the detailed provisions
by some of the state or territorial legislatures. In its original form
the uniform act contains no specific provisions respecting the liability
of air transport carriers for injuries to or death of passengers resulting from airplane accidents. The uniform act as modified and adopted
by the Pennsylvania legislature in its act of 1933 includes provisions
with respect to the liability of air carriers for their passengers.
Liability of air carriers is determined under Pennsylvania law by
4
the rules of law applicable to torts on land.
The Civil Aeronautics Act, 1938, contains no provisions with
respect to the liability of interstate common carriers by aircraft.
Uniform Aviation Liability Act
The Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1938 approved a uniform aviation liability act, but this uniform act
has not been adopted by any of the states or territories. In commenting upon state legislation in this field the Civil Aeronautics Board
has indicated some of the reasons why this legislation has not been
enacted.
"Because the adoption of comprehensive aviation liability
legislation by the legislatures of the 48 states would have an
important effect upon the functions of the then newly created
Civil Aeronautics Authority, the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws decided to refrain from sponsoring the new uniform
act until this agency could study the entire problem and submit
recommendations with respect thereto.
52. (82 U. of P. Law Rev. 165), 1933.
53. Empire Trans. Co. v. Wamautta 0. R. and M Co..
and M'Manus v. L. and Y. R. Co., (4 H. and N. 327), 1859.
54. (P. L. 1929 and 1933).

(63 Pa. 14), 1869;
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"For some time the Board's staff has been engaged in a
study of the problem, covering all phases of the general question. On June 1, 1941, a member of the Board's legal staff completed a report which is believed to be the most exhaustive study
yet prepared on aviation liability. The report has not yet been
formally considered by the Board, but has been released in order
to give interested persons an opportunity to offer comments.
"The report recommends the adoption of a comprehensive
federal aviation liability statute in place of the enactment of
state aviation liability laws. It is urged that the Federal Government define liability in aircraft accidents, and authorize a federal
agency to compel, by regulation, all classes of aircraft operators
to carry liability insurance. In addition, the report criticizes
the present laws governing accident liability, pointing out that
they are not particularly well adapted to the peculiar character55
istics of travel by air."
Summary and Conclusions
Although the law with respect to the liability of aircraft carriers
is in the developmental stage both with respect to statutory and case
law, the following generalizations appear to be warranted by the
present state of the law:
1. Air transportation carriers are included in the category of common carriers if they hold themselves out as such despite the
novelty of the mode of transportation.
2. The status of an air carrier as a common carrier is tested by the
same criteria as applied to other carriers to ascertain their status.
3. If air carriers do in fact hold themselves out to serve the public
with only the well-recognized reservations with respect to capacity and extent of service, they are common carriers.
4. Reasonable rules and regulations with respect to persons accepted or rejected as passengers, limiting the number of passengers carried and the cancellation of service because of weather
conditions may be made and enforced by air carriers without
changing their status as common carriers.
5.

Fixed routes and set schedules are not necessary criteria of the
common carrier status,-the holding out appears to be the
controlling criterion.

6. Aircraft carriers may have the status of common carriers even
55.

Civil Aeronautics Board. Annual Report, 1941, p. 6.
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in instances where the planes used take off and land at the same
point without landing at any other point en route.
7. If carriers by aircraft do in fact serve the general public as
common carriers they are subject generally to the same liability
as other common carriers.
8. Aircraft common carriers are'under legal obligation to exercise
the highest degree of care, vigilance, precaution and skill consistent with the practical operation of the aircraft.
9. Common carriers by airplane are not liable for loss or damage
suffered by their passengers caused by unusual or unpredictable
weather conditions.
10. Passengers transported by air carriers have been held to assume
all the usual or ordinary perils incident to this mode of travel,
when the loss or damage they suffer is not due to negligence on
the part of the carrier or its employees.
11.

No presumption of negligence on the part of the carrier arises
from the mere occurrence of an accident. The passenger alleging
loss or damage must prove the alleged negligence in accordance
with established rules of evidence, excepting in cases where
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable.

12. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine has been applied in air carrier
accidents only when the cause of the accident and its surrounding circumstances were within the sole control of the carrier, and
when no known or acknowledged cause of the accident could be
assigned.
13. Common carriers by aircraft cannot provide in advance for
avoiding or limiting their liability as common carriers for loss
or damage suffered by passengers as a consequence of the negligence of the carrier or its servants, by statements in their tickets
or stipulations in their contracts of transportation denying their
status as a common carrier, limiting their liability or precluding
recovery.
14. The liability of common carriers of property by air is subject
to the same rules as those applicable to other common carriers
of property.
15. Uniform liability of air carriers of passengers and property
appears to be developing along rational lines and the further
development of uniformity is being facilitated by state legislation. There is a possibility that uniformity in air-carrier liability
will be further developed by national legislation.

